Once more the “defeat of terrorism” is preached to the four corners of the world: from the genocidal demagogue Garcia Perez, to the various self-proclaimed and well paid “senderologists”; and from the political parties of reaction and their flunkies, to the bloody police forces; from the muddled and desperate presidential candidates, to well-maintained hacks of all sorts; in unison, as should be expected, all shout at the top of their lungs the purported and worn out ” defeat of Sendero,” so they, in defense of Peruvian reaction and especially of the big bourgeoisie, of social-imperialism and of imperialism, mainly Yankee can create counterrevolutionary public opinion for the benefit of the Old State and the armed forces’ counterinsurgency plans.
Once more their cruel black dream of forever crushing the people and annihilating the People’s War sets in motion the fraud of the “defeat of Sendero, “which will materialize, they claim without proof, as ghosts labeled “strategic failure,” or “the first and foremost loser,” and “split and surrender” of Sendero. As their notorious wishful thinking prays, the Peoples’ War “got into the swamp” in 1989, the elections would show the great defeat of the boycott, and the Party would split, and the fighters of the People’s Army of Liberation would surrender. Let’s begin with the so-called “strategic failure” due to “Sendero’s falling into a swamp in 1989.” Nothing better than starting from the Report on “Great Fulfillment of the Pilot Plan!”, presented to the Central committee in June of last year , one of whose parts we transcribe below:
I. GUERRILLA ACTIONS. PLANS AND CAMPAIGNS DURING NINE YEARS OF PEOPLE’S WAR.
“The process of forging and development of nine years of People’s War contains four milestones: 1. Definition, 2. Preparation, 3. Beginning and, 4. Development; The People’s War, strictly, speaking has developed as a process of qualitative leaps by means of four plans up to now. Each plan is a more higher and comprehensive than the previous plan expressing thus how the People’s War has been getting more complex.
1. THE BEGINNING PLAN, fulfilled by way of two sub plans, spans less than a year: a) from May to July of 1980, 280 actions were completed. That was the beginning; and, b) from July to December of 1980, driving forward the People’s War, fulfilling 1,062 actions. We already notice a leap, a growth, and the time also was longer: in total 1,342 actions.
2. THE DEPLOYMENT PLAN was broader yet, the plans spanning longer periods and consisting of more campaigns. Deployment had a previous plan: Opening up guerrilla zones, and developing platoons and detachments leading to Bases of support. Since the objective was to unfold the war fanning throughout the country, three campaigns were conceived:
a. Conquering weapons and resources,
b. Shaking up the countryside with guerrilla actions,
c. Scouting for the advance toward Bases of support, this last was applied in two stages. It spanned two years and carried out 5,350 actions. While the earlier plan initiated the armed struggle, this new phase generated the New Power. By the end of this plan, the armed forces entered directly to fight us (December of 82). This plan was more complex: several campaigns began to be managed as part of the same plan, each campaign marked by the definition of political strategy and military strategy.
3. PLAN OF CONQUERING BASES, from May 1983 to September of 86. First two campaigns were unfolded: Defend, Develop and Construct precisely in 1983-84, which was the most difficult moment; the armed forces were stopped short by those campaigns. This third plan developed a Campaign of great importance with a sub plan, The Great Leap, which meant largely overcoming the problems, and expanding the theater of military and political operations from Cajamarca to Puno, centered in the mountains but also spanning the Jungle and the Coast. By then, too, reaction thought they had annihilated us and swept away the People’s War. The plan of Conquering Bases took three years, four months, and consisted of 28,621 actions; it provided support bases and the entire support system, guerrilla zones, zones of operation and points of action.
4. GREAT PLAN OF DEVELOPING BASES (GPDB), with this we entered a very transcendental process because the support bases are the core of the People’s War, there is no People’s War without support bases; the Central Committee [of the PCP] decided to apply the plan first as a Pilot Plan, from December 1986 to May 89, 2 years eight months more or less, with three campaigns, the third one in two parts; it consisted of 63,052 actions; it showed its merits and exceeded the objectives, now we begin its definitive approval. Thus, we have in nine years a total of 98,365 actions; counting the complementary actions there were more than 100,000; mainly, the great final conclusion completed in July, as a second special ending. The plans are strategically centralized and tactically decentralized; they are strategic plans that include actions and construction; they are developed through campaigns.
Later the plan begin to be more complex and of longer duration; later still sub plans are developed, or limited plans developed within the general plans; and finally on entering into the GPDB, we propose applying it as a pilot plan. Each plan has its political and military strategy. They are tested and implemented in battle; the results show the readjustments to be made, and above all the subsequent conditions for the success of the subsequent plan. We concretize our judgement of the results in clear phrases that allow us to wield them easily, for example: “The Great Completion of the Pilot Plan!” The Central Committee approves Strategic Operating plans; such as the 1979 Expanded National Conference agreed upon, strategically centralized plans, which also takes into consideration the operational situation and establish the four forms of struggle:
1. agitation and propaganda,
3. selective annihilation and,
4. guerrilla combat.
They determine the parts, establish periods and fix the chronology. We must always pay close attention to strategic centralization, since that’s what determines our ability to within the plan and to develop the revolutionary waves systematically and simultaneously hit diverse and broad areas with all possible forms and means, to deliver hard and serious defeats to the enemy. Those who have studied the principles and military theory of President Mao always point out that he established a strategically centralized plan, a key point that allows us to develop the actions: Applying it has enabled us to deliver hard and simultaneous blows to the enemy in almost the entire country, thus causing them more difficulties. We must insist on strategically centralized plans, without forgetting they are tactically decentralized.
Apply Strategic Operating Plans because these establish the nexus between strategy and tactics. Already comrade Stalin had suggested visualizing the bond joining the strategic whole with the concrete actions. Let’s point out how we began “out of nothing,” because that is how President Mao taught us. The main thing is to have a Party with a correct and just line, then the problem is to begin. Since the problem is not how many we are but is rather, if we want to initiate the armed struggle or not.
With the People’s War we have developed the Party, built the People’s Guerrilla Army (today the People’s Army of Liberation) and molded the New Power, and our mass work has experienced great quantitative and qualitative leaps; we have been wresting the weapons away from the enemy and the transfer of modern weapons is taking place more often. The People’s War has brought us to the Grand Completion of the Pilot Plan, which we finished successfully and brilliantly! Thus, we have exceeded the accomplishment of the Pilot Plan of the Great Plan to Develop Bases; from that derives the need to Drive Forward the Support Bases. If we had not conceived it that way [as a pilot plan], it would not have the sense of having been completed. It began as pilot plan because this great plan implied very important qualitative changes. It was already proved in practice, its mandatory objective was to proceed with, Drive Forward the Development of Support Bases! , within the new GREAT PLAN OF DEVELOPING BASES TO SERVE THE CONQUEST OF POWER in the entire country.
In nine years we have developed, through these plans, the People’s Army and the New Power and we have applied and will insist that the Party leads the People’s War and absolutely leads the army, since we are guided by the Party commanding the gun and will never allow the gun to be in command of the Party. We have also insisted that, as President Mao taught us,war follows politics; we will follow Lenin: War is the continuation of politics by military means; it has been and will continue to be that way, therefrom derives the class character of war. When Marxism is negated by others, we communists have to reaffirm ourselves more in our principles. When we confront counterrevolutionary campaigns like those worldwide against Marxism-Leninism-Maoism, like those in our country against the Party and the People’s War, those are the moments we must grasp our principles more firmly and visualize the undeclinable objective toward which we are going: Communism.
Let’s insist on this more today, when Gorbachev, Deng and their cronies spread that we can no longer understand war with criteria from the past, that we can no longer say war is the continuation of politics; that what Clausewitz set forth, to which Lenin agreed and President Mao developed, is not a principle that applies today according to Gorbachev, who also cries out loud that war will take us to the disappearance of the human race, that war will have neither winners nor losers because no one will survive it: sinister positions he inherited from Khrushchev. We condemn, and mark with fire, those revisionist positions against the People’s War; we reaffirm ourselves that People’s War is the continuation of politics by the force of arms in the service of the proletariat and the people, of their interests. If we were not firm in our principles and flexible in their application we’d lose the direction of the people’s war and crash down into revisionism. That’s why we must persist in Marxism-Leninism-Maoism, Gonzalo Thought, in the people’s war and in the Communist Party leading it until Communism. Furthermore, let’s emphasize:
2. more complex plan;
3. the new, Great Plan of Developing Bases to Serve the Conquest of Power in the entire Country! ; and,
4. persisting in the principles of People’s War.
COMBAT ACTIONS AND ARMED STRIKE.
The Pilot Plan was successfully completed in three campaigns. The second part of the third campaign, Grand Completion of the Pilot Plan! , Whose balance we are evaluating, materialized an increment of 172% compared to the first part, a very noticeable increase even if the second part lasted longer than the first. In nine years of People’s War there were 100,000 actions, this figure does not include complementary actions. The total number of actions of the, Grand Completion of the Pilot Plan! was 32,646 and the third campaign, in its two parts, shows an immense jump relative to the second campaign of the Pilot Plan, since it quadruples it despite lasting only three more months; there we have one of the extraordinary results of the First Congress of the Party.
AGITATION AND PROPAGANDA.
It’s one of the four forms of People’s War and, consequently, it is erroneous to see it as a separate thing; not to see it as a form of war leads us to make mistakes. The main thing is to develop it as the most profound campaign of agitation and propaganda ever made by any party in the country; that is, propaganda as the diffusion of ideas aiming toward the objective, and agitation as the utilization of concrete problems, which the masses struggle through. These actions, like the other forms, spread revolution, People’s War, politics, ideology; today they disseminate the need to conquer Power countrywide. Thus, we go down to the lowest masses, who normally can neither read nor write;
Engels taught us to solidify with facts the ideas in the minds of men, as a matter of principle; it is the material fact that generates knowledge; the four forms of war are material facts that those who execute them, or experience them, militants, fighters and masses, go on enduring the effect and the confirmation of the need for the war, for conquering political objectives, for conquering Power; of the need for the ideology of the proletariat. Thus, agitation and propaganda deepen among the masses of the country, stir the mind, disseminate and go on confirming the need for revolution; they deal with the real source of knowledge.
Agitation and propaganda develop as psychological action and psychological warfare. Lenin said that propaganda is never lost, no matter how much time there is between the sowing and the reaping, and if the action is done with weapons in hand, with armed actions aimed at mobilizing the masses, that is the best school to forge the people in the ideology of the proletariat, in the politics of the Party and in the need for the People’s War to conquer Power. Let’s consider its great importance: it is linked to winning over and to forming public opinion to the fact that the People’s War goes on generating a spirit of transformation among the masses, as Tulio C. Guerrero says. It has much potential to disseminate the People’s War, and is fundamental to generate public opinion, to accentuate the People’s War, the political objectives, the conquest of Power, Marxism-Leninism-Maoism, Gonzalo Thought, the ideology, the politics of the Party and the policies on different levels, and we must keep in mind that we cannot conquer Power without generating public opinion.
They continue to play an important role, hitting the Peruvian economy hard, which develops itself in the worst conditions, in the deepest crisis in our history. Sabotaging the mining sector that has transcendent importance because the largest percentage of convertible currency comes from this activity; it hits the Peruvian State directly because, besides creating problems for it, those are blows it receives in the economic activity of the State, for instance Centromin. It creates problems for the State itself, we burden with debt their corporative plans, which are fouled up. Furthermore, their “social measures,” which they must always recur, are also hit and so the counterrevolutionary armed action itself is weakened.
The sabotage of the electrical network is very important; the last few blackouts affected nine departments, from the northern Department La Libertad to the southern Department of ICA and going through the nation’s capital, going inside the departments of Junin, Pasco, Hu nuco, Ayacucho, Huancavelica, the heart of their economic system, the very axis of their administrative system, which is the capital. The blackouts are generating more problems for them each time.
The paper El Comercio [Lima] published about the last blackout that electricity could only be restored in Lima 10 days afterward. They have implied that they intend to utilize more thermal generators, a greater expense because the cost to produce that type of energy is very high. Besides hitting the public administration and their banking system data processing, industry also experiences difficulties. They greatly impact on the masses because whoever sees the blackout knows what its cause is, and the masses see how the Peruvian State, expressing its class character, tends first to the needs of the big bourgeoisie and postpones those of the people; that way, the masses are gradually forging clearer judgement each time.
The big bourgeoisie suffers with the sabotages, hence the Society of Mines and Petroleum demand that armed forces and police reinforce the military occupation in the mines. The main thing is to let the effects of sabotage be felt in the most important, most advanced economic zone, in the central economic zone which at the same time is the most strategic zone to restructure the old Peruvian society, their old State.
It is increasing and hitting hard the authorities. We reaffirm that this is way the functioning of the State apparatus is beheaded and paralyzed. Some, the reactionaries and their cronies the opportunists, say “how is it possible to vilely murder mayors elected by the people?” First, it must be explained that the election is only a reactionary instrument of the bourgeois democratic system. We will never allow ourselves to be deceived by the political stupidity of those who only speak of dictatorship if there are no elections. United Left (IU) and their ilk may say such things; but a communist can never think that way since the State, first and foremost, is a class dictatorship, and the mayors, the governors, or the bureaucratic authorities, of the CORDES or similar organizations, are part of that State system, of that violent reactionary structure. Hitting or beheading State authorities or bureaucrats of whatever level hampers the running of the State and even more generates a Power vacuum.
One of the traditional problems of the Peruvian State, as Mariategui already noted, is that it has never been able to extend its power to the remotest corners of the country; it is a fact that reaction is sited in central locations, in the cities, and has been extending its power to intermediate size cities, and once in a while it reaches small cities; while the annexes or towns in the countryside, villages or shantytowns are beyond the State and do not endure steady control; it is a problem linked to the semi-feudal bases sustaining it.
So, then, the annihilations undermine the State order and that is good. It helps to erode it, because the political vacuum created is left in our hands, to fill it and exert power. Having five forms of Power we can set up any one of them. Remember that some say, “the Vietnam example is good,” but they forget 13,000 authorities were annihilated there; thus, the annihilations made by the Vietnamese were good, but the ones we make are bad? Why? What objectives did they accomplish and do we accomplish? To undermine order, a problem clearly established by Cassinello in [his book] Guerrilla and Counter guerrilla Warfare.
The quantity is high and its percentage [within the four forms of guerrilla warfare] begins to grow even more. The two fundamental forms of combat actions are developing: 1) ambushes and 2. assaults. Ambushes are developed, each time more stunningly and we are hitting the armed forces; to [selectively] hit their officers has much importance and we already see its results: petitions to leave the army are growing so much that they had to prohibit them; desertions increase and clashes among them are starting; the selling of weapons is increasing and will continue to grow. On this point reaction reaches the extremes of sarcasm, stupidity and ridicule by decrying we are “cowardly ambushing them,” “they don’t fight face to face.” In what ambush does one show the face?
The key to ambush is surprise. Ambush is a norm to us, as it is to all armies, but we should not allow ourselves to be ambushed nor counter ambushed. When we hit the military, they cry out, “Barbaric! ,” “Brutal murder!”; so then, how do they say “we are at war” and what role do their armed forces have other than to fight in a war? Mercado Jarrin says the armed forces are the “insurance policy of the nation”; yes, they are the insurance policy of reaction and its backbone; that is why we have to annihilate them totally and completely. Guerrilla combat, like annihilations, are lowering the morale of the armed forces, which are drafted troops fighting against their will, with little instruction and kept in check by ferocious reactionary iron discipline.
Some say they would rather have a more reduced professional army, better armed with sophisticated weapons and very well paid, but that would not be beneficial to them, it would only allow us to increase our forces and make more critical the disproportionate ratio between us and them; as is well known, the norm is that when a guerrilla activity is well developed, reaction requires a ratio of up to 20 to one, as shown by international experience; in our case, although we are not highly developed, they need to increase their forces. In second place, can they do it? , No. They do not possess enough means to do it, officers themselves are badly paid and the severe crisis the country is experiencing does not permit great investments like that, consequently they need the “foreign aid” of the superpowers and/or imperialist powers and to them they appeal more and more. The USSR just sold them helicopters from Afghanistan at bargain prices.
The USA gives them “military aid,” training and giving them resources, and their direct participation is obvious, such as the struggle against “drug trafficking” in words and against the People’s War in deeds. Keep in mind what we have seen already about a possible Yankee aggression, considering especially the U.S. actions in Huallaga; remember what we read in the military magazine of the U.S. army about national strategy, it maintains that even not having a declared war, they develop subversive wars, insurrections, terrorist actions, drug trafficking and that those are areas in which the armed forces must participate and fight. Thus, they are finding serious problems with the development of the guerrilla combat. As regards quality, we are seeing a leap especially in the guerrilla combats; each time the assaults are more important, an example is Uchiza, which even caused the enemy internal contradictions between the armed forces and the government, and between the armed forces and police forces; and successive ambushes show a better handling of them.
It is a new modality in the struggle, which implies an entire combination of actions, it has to manage the four forms of war: agitation and propaganda, sabotage, selective annihilation and guerrilla combat; and at the same time it implies mobilizing an enormous mass which helps the force of the New Power, the existence of the New State and the questioning and negation of the old State. The armed strike, militarily speaking, manages the four forms and impacts on huge numbers of masses leading to isolating vast areas and demonstrating besides how easy it is to isolate the capital city (Lima). Since 1979 we know that Lima is the most vulnerable capital in Latin America, keep that in mind to continue hitting them, and for tomorrow, when we have Power in the whole country, we will defend it from counterrevolution.
Confronted with armed strikes reaction will aim, as it does, to fetter them and prevent them, to break them up; it will make false calls to strike or will use its weapons; for instance in Chosica they called a false strike just to make a show of force, to pressure, intimidate and lead the masses to reject the strike; but that will not be enough for them, they will have to repress the armed strikes, answer them militarily, not merely as a show of force, but to break the actual armed strikes with fire and blood. Armed strikes are also making the revisionists nervous, the trade union bureaucracy, all those who ride on the backs of the masses; these hacks will continue opposing the armed strikes claiming these are “an authoritarian imposition,” that “the unions are not the ones calling them.”
Our answer is simple: it is not an industrial or trade union action but a military action to keep on isolating, hitting, eroding and undermining the old order so the people can see clearer each time the powerlessness, which the Peruvian State is being reduced to. Therefore, we are not talking only about a struggle for labor demands or just vindications, but rather we are developing a military action to undermine the old order, show its impotency, create public opinion and impact the broader masses; and that, in perspective, entails the sectionalizing of the country in a more extensive way, which will involve another problem of the plan we put in motion: the leap from guerrilla warfare to mobile warfare.
Military work develops in the country and the city following the path of surrounding the cities from the countryside, and our specific condition is that we also shake up the cities, but the four forms of war develop mainly in the countryside, and as complement in the cities. That scheme will continue to develop more, considering that the armed strike happens above all in the cities; for example the armed strike in Central Peru involving important cities like Huancayo, Jauja, Oroya, Huanuco, Cerro de Pasco; that is, departmental and provincial capitals.
Work in the countryside is good, extremely important and principal, but advancing the work in the cities is a necessity that will increase and we must focused on that type of work. In synthesis, as regards quality and quantity we can say that qualitatively and quantitatively the People’s War is developing strongly and vigorously; we persist on the road of surrounding the cities from the countryside; the countryside is principal and the encirclements are already closing in more and more. Therefore, the People’s War has made a great quantitative and qualitative leap in this Pilot Plan and it germinates a more transcendent advance.
PLAN OF STRATEGIC DEVELOPMENT
Our investigation shows that everything remains firmly grounded within the main points (the axis, sub axis, directions and mobile lines), they are well established and are being managed even better. What derives from this is that at this moment we have no need to change things; it would even be inconvenient to alter them at this time. Reaction enters into strong difficulties and contradictions; the problem of the municipal and general elections, the two electoral runs and the new administration take them to a collusion and contention; but each collusion is sustained within the contention and can explode at any time; these situations, of contention, of rupture, that can even lead to a coup d’etat at least in the next two years that must lead us to advance boldly. For that reason it is not convenient to vary our plans and we must strive to wield them better. Don’t forget that all of our Party’s work is developed within the strategic development plan, provided that the Party leads everything.
THEATER OF OPERATIONS
It remains even clearer that we are developing within the Sierra region of the country. Historically Peru has had a vertebrate axis: the center-south mountains, it was that way at the times of the Incas; in the war with Chile it was the area defending itself better and where forces can retreat before a foreign attack. We also develop within the jungle strips, areas which are showing good fighting conditions for the masses; most peasants there are linked to coca growing, the Upper Huallaga is the largest producing area in Latin America, larger than those in Colombia and Bolivia; for that reason as well it is important to reaction. We are also developing within the Apurimac jungle strip and we must emphasize our penetration into the Central region.
The perspective is to cover all the jungle strips. The theater is also being extended on the Coast. From the edges of the Coastal areas, you can penetrate into the Sierra, for example the mid-North (Norte medio) and the Mid- South. This leads us to develop the other coastal zones, especially the work in the northern and southern coast of our country. Also, to develop more the cities in the Sierra. It is very important to focus the struggle in the cities, it has to do with the insurrection; if we don’t prepare for the seizure of the cities, mainly the largest ones, to complete the final stage of the People’s War, the conquest of power in the entire country will be delayed. The work in Lima must be developed more, considering that it is the capital.
Also the theater enables us to develop incursions, which facilitate developing the theater or retreating during enemy offensives. In synthesis, the theater is showing its expansion and the interrelation between the committees, also the capacity of incursion between the one and the others. Consequently, the perspective of the theater is to vertebrate the entire People’s War. With the development of the war, we will have to redefine the committees, above all to conform to the development of the EGP (People’s Army.) Thus, the theater shows how it is expanding and we see a process of vertebrate in which the encirclement of the cities is setting in, not just the capital but the rest of the cities too. This ends the partially transcribed report. But let us consider the following outline:
PLANS AND CAMPAIGNS OF THE PEOPLE’S WAR
THIRD MILESTONE: BEGINNING OF THE PEOPLE’S WAR
I. INITIATION PLAN (MAY-DEC. 1980) Initiate the Armed Struggle
Drive Forward Guerrilla Warfare
1, 342 actions
FOURTH MILESTONE: DEVELOPMENT OF GUERRILLA WARFARE
II. DEPLOYMENT PLAN (JAN. 81- JAN 83)
Open Guerrilla Zones
First Campaign: Conquer Arms and Resources
Second Campaign: Rock the Countryside with Guerrilla Actions
Third Campaign: Stir 1 and 2 [in the countryside] to Advance Toward the Support Bases
5, 350 actions
III. PLAN TO CONQUER BASES (MAY 1983-SEP. 1986)
Defend Develop and Construct I and II
First Campaign: Initiate Great Leap!
Second Campaign: Develop the Great Leap!
Third Campaign: Develop the People’s War!
Fourth Campaign: Cap off the Great Leap! (First Part) Cap off the Great Leap with a Golden Seal! (Second Part)
28, 621 actions
IV. GREAT PLAN TO DEVELOP BASES.
PILOT PLAN (DEC. 1986-MAY 1989)
First Campaign: Pilot Plan to Develop Bases
Second Campaign: To Brilliantly Fullfill it and Establish a Historical Miliestone!
Third Campaign: To consolidate and Develop the Great Completion! (First Part) Great Completion of the Pilot Plan! (Second Part)
63, 052 actions
V. GREAT PLAN TO DEVELOP BASES AND TO SERVE THE CONQUEST OF POWER (AUG. 89- )
First Campaign: To Drive Forward the Development of Support Bases
The partial implementation to the end of 1989.
23, 090 actions
TOTAL NUMBER OF ACTIONS
NOTE: Up to this time four milestones have been specified in the development of the People’s War:
FIRST: DEFINITION, whose center is the IX Plenum of the Central Committee, June of 1979.
SECOND: PREPARATION, centered in the Expanded National Conference, November 1979.
Furthermore, this table does not include the actions carried out within the complementaries [of each established plan]. This shows clearly the immense progress and great development of the People’s War, unless someone tried to sustain the absurd claim that the leap was quantitative, a change, but not qualitative. It is seen clearly and convincingly how each subsequent plan implies a higher leap than the previous one. If we compare plans III and IV, although plan III took three years and four months, and plan IV only took two years and six months, the number of actions in the latter plan more than doubles the former. On the other hand, if we consider the application of the new GREAT PLAN TO DEVELOP BASES IN SERVICE OF THE CONQUEST OF POWER just begun in August of 1989 with the First Campaign of Driving Forward the Development of Support Bases, in its four months of execution, until the end of last year, it materialized 23,090 guerrilla actions.
Consequently, considering that four months is half the duration of the Grand Completion of the Pilot Plan! , The second part of the preceding plan, the new Great Plan has already achieved the notable increase of 41.5 percent in its guerrilla actions; an increase whose importance is better understood if we keep in mind the enormous increment that the completion of the Pilot Plan implied. And if we compare results, the 23,090 guerrilla actions involve 19.0 percent of the total actions up to December of 1989; 23.5% of the actions in the nine years before this plan started and 36.6% of the actions in the entire Pilot Plan. In about four months we achieved almost 37% of what we achieved previously in thirty!
There it is, the new Great Plan has begun resolutely and victoriously. Finally, if we center on 1989, the year of the proclaimed and supposed “swamping”; considering from October 88 to December 89, a period in which 32,644 actions were registered in the completion referred to above and 23,090 in the New Plan, we have a total of 55,736 guerrilla actions; that is about 46% of all the actions completed. There you have the great “defeat of Sendero!”
CENTRAL COMMITTEE OF THE COMMUNIST PARTY OF PERU
Ediciones Bandera Roja, May 1990