The following text purporting to be a CPI (Maoist) policy document has been made available by the counter-insurgency NGO SATP. We are reproducing it here because assuming its authentic we think it provides an interesting look at the status of the Peoples War as of 2005-Signalfire.
3. In Andhra Pradesh the temporary freedom is changed and oppression is becoming severe. By now 30 cadres became martyrs in the encounters in the state. In this summer, the enemy would step up the oppression. On the other side, our resistance is weak. Though our peoples base and recruitment relatively increased, though we have made noticeable political impact on the people, we did not get results in our resistance. In our forces, new recruits are in good proportion.
There is a need to train these people politically and militarily. In this condition, with the growing losses, there is possibility that these new forces that joined the party may get demoralised. The situation of disappointment of people is arising. In this stage, there is a need to concentrate on the resistance and damage the enemy. By protecting our forces, we should organise the people and concentrate on resisting the enemy. For this, we have to adopt the following strategy:
1. (To A.Cs) Our squads should move in wide geographical areas.
2. ( ) In strategical areas, there should two LGSs and one SGS in a platoon formation under the A.C. committee in the A.C. area. These formations should be headed by an A.C.M. The entire platoon will be led by the A.C. As a part of the centralization and decentralization, this platoon will undertake organising people and resist the enemy.
3. (DC to PM & DCMs to concerned AC) There should be District Committee Formations.
4. (DC) Party work should be organised by sending 1 + 2 Squads in the plains and by sending PRs in the towns. When they are unable to move because of oppression, they should take the shelter of platoon. In plain areas, S.G.Ss should be formed with at least five members. They should continuously organise attacks in the plains.
5. If we have the availability of our forces, we should form separate combat platoons.
6. (Only SC/SZC/DC/DVC): For political and other single actions we should form SAT (Special Actions Teams) at the district and state level.
7. (Related topics to the concerned SZCs, DC/DVCs) Spread to the selected areas in the central region.
8. With a view to organize people under the conditions of oppression, there should be self protection, secret organization, clandestine operations under different covers and in different forms. In order to establish lively relations with the people, class organisations should made to work by strengthening them.
9. Unified action forum should be formed from village level to state level and they should be unified.
10. The intelligence network of the enemy should be identified and it should be neutralised with the support of people. The covert strategy of the enemy should be neutralised. All the methods decided for the recruitment should be followed. Ex-naxalites who surrendered to police should not be recruited. Keeping the covert strategy of the enemy in view, the new recruits should be screened.
11. (DCs and ACs) By following the Guerrilla war strategies, our forces should work in Centralisation and Decentralisation method. Depending on the local terrain and the oppression of the enemy and by keeping in view the changing political situation, D.C and A.Cs should take initiative and centralise forces under their area. As a part of this, when conditions are not favourable, they should shift the forces from plain areas where there is no protection to tactical areas.
When the enemy takes up oppression campaign, DVC, A.Cs as part of self protection strategy, should utilize the weaknesses of enemy and damage them. The District and Divisional committees should take up TCOC.
12. The general principle of Guerilla warfare is that the enemy should be damaged in his weak positions. While concentrating on small attacks on the weak points of enemy, plans for big attacks should be done. By coordinating the small and big attacks on the enemy, we can progress the guerilla warfare in the present conditions.
13. (Up to DC, SC/SZC): There is a need of temporary migration to the neighbouring tactical areas to protect the forces
14. In this situation where in we are losing our leaders and cadres, for the sake of protection, A.P.S.C., N.T.S.Z.C should strategically shift our forces from N.T.A.P. to tactical areas.
15. There should be coordination between the three zones of A.P. All formulated systems should be implemented. Required information should be communicated at the earliest. Should effectively organise programmes on the problems of people with proper coordination.
16. (SZC) C.R.B will coordinate the border zones of Central Region. Apart from this, for the local coordination, under the guidance of concerned SZCMs, A.C., D.Cs of both the sides should form suitable systems and mechanisms.
17. (RB, SC/SZC ) Joint programs should be organised by following the decisions of C.R.B, C.M.C to nullify the attacks of enemy and to achieve the strategic goals. A separate circular is prepared on the situation of A.P.
5. ( ) Regarding the formation of district Janatana Sarkars.
In accordance with the decisions made at the extensive meeting (2004) of DKSZC, one A.R.P.C is formed in South Basthar and Maad.
Concerned S.Z.Cs and D.V.Cs are of the opinion to form one A.R.P.C in each of North Basthar, West Basthar, South Basthar and Maad divisions in the coming 8 to 9 months. In this backdrop, C.R.B has discussed in detail, the formation of Janathana Sarkaars and extending guidance that is applicable to all zones.
1. Based on the RPCs of 300-500 villages or else based on at least 3 ARPCs, District Janatana Sarkars should be formed. This should be taken as the general base for the formation of District Janatana Sarkars. We cannot implement the Peoples state power in true sense if we form District Janathana Sarkars based on the existing A.P.R.P.Cs by formally unifying them.
Hence, by unifying A.R.P.Cs on one hand, (by involving people extensively in the political field, conducting agricultural revolution, spreading of peoples army and strengthening it, strengthening the peoples base, spreading and strengthening the communist party, training people and A.R.P.Cs on the management of state power) the basis for the formation of district Janatana Sarkaars should be prepared.
2. In the areas chosen for the formation of District Janatana Sarkaars (immediately South Basthar, Maad), militia should harass the police and Para military forces, centralise the guerilla forces with MFs as their centers, cause loss to the enemy, annihilate the enemy and neutralise the fighting capability of the enemy or else drive away the enemy from the area.
Without causing losses and neutralising the fighting capabilities of Para military forces, there cannot be any basis for the formation of District Janatana Sarkaars. Therefore, to stop the attacks of enemy on A.R.P.Cs and to consolidate A.R.P.Cs, thereby to lay foundation for the formation of District Janatana Sarkars, Companies should be formed. By forming companies and by organising annihilatory attacks on the enemy, the power of the enemy is damaged to that extent.
The destruction of the power of enemy is based on the extent of organising and political awareness of the people to take over the power and also based on the extent of damage done to the military power of the enemy. Based on these, a basis would form for the establishment of peoples state power. Therefore in the areas where the formation of Janatana Sarkaars are planned, concentration should be on destroying the military power of the enemy.
3. Peoples Militia should be strengthened, extended and the fighting capability should be increased.
4. As a precondition to the formation of District Janathana Sarkaars, peoples unions should be formed at the district level and they should be made to work effectively. Youth associations should be formed. Efforts should be made to form unions in other fields. Efforts should be made to unify all the oppressed classes and sections in the peoples unions. In the district committees of peoples unions, party comrades of AC and DC should be present and they should make the unions work effectively.
5. With a view to protect the District Janathana Sarkaars and also to unify and widen them, strategic joint action forums should be formed at Zonal, Divisional level in different forms and different levels.
6. The DVCs involved in the formation of District Janathana Sarkaars should be strengthened by number and by efficiency.
7. The district president of the District Janathana Sarkaars should invariably a S.Z.C.M or at least a D.V.C.M for their effective running.
8. In the District Janathana Sarkaar, apart from the representatives of area Janathana Sarkaars, representatives from the party divisional committee, divisional military command, company, district peoples unions should be taken.
9. A sub-committee should be formed from S.Z.C to unify, coordinate R.P.Cs and Peoples Unions and for their effective functioning. To guide the District Janathana Sarkaars, instead of forming a separate committee like GBPC, Divisional Committees should be strengthened to guide all the fields in the District Committee (Mass work, organs of peoples power, military field, economy, joint action, cultural field etc.,) and under guidance of the divisional committees, proletariat should lead the District Janathana Sarkaars.
Peoples state power formed at any level should be organized and widened. To resist the attacks of enemy to destroy peoples state power at different levels, people should be motivated and organized politically and made to operate actively against the government in more number of forms. Then only, we will be able to form peoples state power on one hand and on the other we will destroy the power of the enemy.
In the light of this understanding, efforts should be made for the formation of District Janathana Sarkaars by guiding the area R.P.Cs. B. With a view to strengthen the strategic goals and to increase the armed power of our military forces, concentration should be done on the following activities:
◦ In the resistance campaigns taken up in the C.R.B area, to the extent possible, the strategy of seizing weapons by annihilating enemy should be implemented.
◦ With a view to make the Ts and JOPs taken up in the Central Region a success, the leadership while participating directly and indirectly, should prepare specific plans and concentrate to implement them.
◦ P&P targets should be decided and hit as per plan.
◦ Three forces of the PLGA should be coordinated and actions should be successful.
◦ The weaknesses in eradicating the enemy and seizing the weapons should be overcome. Large number of people should be organized politically to counter the multi faceted fascist attack of the enemy. They should be organized in class wars. The attack of enemy should be strongly repulsed by the participation of oppressed people and people of various sections.
7. Resolution Regarding Diversification:
(A) (For A.O.B.S.Z.C) Contiguity should be achieved in the A.O.B zone as felt by the S.Z.C. and thereby solve the coordination problem of SZC. For this, with a goal to form x division, should spread there. This has to be formed as soon as possible and this should be strengthened as per the strategic goals.
• One DVCM along with ACM and P.Rs should be allotted from the forces sent from A.P.
• Division should be strengthened by allotting forces from Zone.
• As felt by SZC, east division should be divided into two. It should be spread to the extent of possibility of achieving organizational contiguity.
• To give continuity towards first zone ( N.T), spread towards tamarind – tree – area (probably Chintur forest area) through a task.
10. (For A.O.B.S.Z.C) As per the resolution of CC(P), AOB SZCM Suman should be transferred for the needs of Orissa organization perspective. Basadara division, leadership, cadre should be given. (For A.O.B. P.B): For the organizational contiguity of A.O.B zone, for the needs of diversification, Com. Sabitha, Bhaskar or Orissa part should be retained in A.O.B only. In the adjoining areas of zone, in urban and suburban areas of A.P. and Orissa, should organise by allotting some forces.
11. Resolution on Talks with Govt. of A.P.
( For Party Members) In Andhra Pradesh talks were held in between Congress government and our party, i.e., APSC, NTSZC and AOBSZC during the month of October 2004. In the revolutionary history of our country, it is the first time that talks were held in between revolutionaries and exploitative ruling classes by declaring cease fire. This cease fire started on June 16th, 2004 and continued for a period of six months till 16th December 2004.
In the first week of January 2005, after a gap of eight months, exchanges of fire and fake encounters started in between our forces and the police. By the second week, our party leadership announced that there is no alternative but the withdrawal from talks because of the cruel oppression of the police. Party gave call to all party cadres, PLGA fighters and people of Andhra Pradesh to intensify the peoples’ war against the ruling classes and their specially trained oppressive forces.
It is important to codify the positive and negative issues and to take some lessons from these talks and to formulate directive principles to conduct such wars in the future political scenario. The Congress Government which came into power during the May 2004 by promising to conduct talks with naxalites and not to indulge in fake encounters has no other alternative but to conduct talks with our party and other revolutionary organisations in the state.
The immense pressure mounted for the past few years by different sections of people and various democratic institutions and persons to end the cruel state oppression and to hold talks is the reason behind holding talks. Initially Congress government tried not to declare ceasefire by showing some reason. It announced that police would stop combing operations and encounters and will maintain restraint. As our party leadership put strong demand for the ceasefire, at least government had to agree from 3 months ceasefire from June 16th, which was extended by three months i.e., up to 16th September.
But, it brought pressure to add seventh clause in the ceasefire pre-conditions stating that our armed squads should limit to forest and should not enter into the villages. Our party organised people and various organisations and moulded the public opinion in favour of unconditional talks. With this demand, organised a huge rally on 30th September. When it became clear that talks would not take place without withdrawing that clause, government withdrew and it had to agree for talks. In holding talks with the government, our leadership in Andhra Pradesh has followed the guidelines issued in the circular of the Polit Bureau on talks and the guidelines found in the erstwhile CPI(ML)Peoples war CC resolution of 2002.
The circulars issued by AP, NT, AOB state committees and PB in May – June of 2004 have analysed the post election situation of AP. The party has explained the duties as per the existing situation and formulated the guidelines for the talks. The talks with government held by our party helped in identifying that the government is an agent of bourgeois, feudal class under the support of imperialism which would not solve even a single problem of the people and the only way is to destroy this state and these classes through peoples’ war and by establishing a new democratic state and society.
Our party representatives by holding talks directly during the talks period have proved that Maoist revolutionaries will not only fight in war field with guns but also can do political war by entering the enemy’s camp. We could concentrate on three important political slogans i.e., democracy for the people, self-reliance and distribution of land. By August, these came forward strongly. In the rally held on 30th September, these received wide publicity. Our representative team could directly speak to workers, farmers, women, students, intellectuals, SC, ST, BC, Minorities and other sections. Our role in the talks had a positive impact on all these sections.
Our war in the political field and in the field of talks could secure political and organisational benefit to the party. Due to limitations of our forces and due to loss of leadership in the protracted oppression from 1991, we cold not utilise the ceasefire situation to the fullest extent.
Political Organisational Utility:
Our party benefited politically as we could utilise the situation prevailed during the talks as per a plan. State was shook by peoples political equations and made the ruling classes shiver. At last, the ruling class had to impose sanctions. The public meeting of 16th November was the last meeting. That also was held under many restrictions.
During this period, our party politics were widely spread among the people. Due to our principled attitude, we could win many organisations, democrats and mediators in the state. People who are in severe turmoil and searching for alternative, found our party as the only efficient political force to solve their problems. The strategies followed by us have brought the party on the political center stage of the state. We have exposed the government in our first round of talks. The government, unable to answer the demands raised by our representatives, fell in political self defense which was more exposed in the anti people policies of imposing restrictions on public meetings and rallies, stressing on leaving weapons as a precondition for talks, starting combing operations from the end of November, ultimately by starting fake encounters from the first week of January 2005.
Due to this, crisis with in Congress and also between the partners Congress and TRS deepened. Likewise, differences between the ruling party and other opposition parties widened on the issues of talks and ceasefire. Now, there is more legality in the view of people for the armed agricultural revolutionary war politics. During this period, we could develop our peoples base to some extent. We could spread into the people widely. We could organise our forces. We could increase our recruitment. We could take care against the covert agents. We could train cadre politically and militarily by conducting military camps at the district and area level. We could form party cells. We have formed peoples union units and village militia units.
Physical conditions prevailed for the formation of joint action committees from the lower level to the state level wherever possible. During this period, we have spread our areas of operations in the state. By adopting proper political tactics if we utilise the present situation, we can create more conducive atmosphere to advance peoples’ war. Enemy also utilised the situation of talks period. Prepared the action plan for the cease fire tactics by undertaking village development programmes.
Tried to divert the youth from joining PLGA by providing self employment opportunities and also by providing sports and gymnastics etc., tried to form informer section by luring. During this period, enemy entered in many of our villages by tri point scheme. As the situation was advantageous to us on the whole, right from the beginning, he tried to start attacks by leaving the talks.
Shortcomings and Weaknesses:
Viewing on the negative side, in one section of party cadre and leadership, some legalist tendencies arose. They concentrated more on organising legal meetings and rallies instead of diverting people to militant struggles on political demands. We expected that the enemy attack may start December onwards. That is why we have decided to be careful in preparing our forces to face the enemy attacks, regarding the movements of our squads, coordination with legal peoples unions, publicity in press. However, many weaknesses crept in.
Mistakes occurred in our legalism in journey, technical mistakes, meetings of peoples union leaders, transport of weapons and other equipment, maintenance of dumps etc., We have used cell phones indiscriminately. We have written our military plans, recruitment and resolutions on various organisational matters etc., without using any code. Due to our failure in taking proper care, they fell in the hands of police. We committed technical mistakes while giving interviews.
Some Comrades in the leadership at various levels also committed this mistake. We have planted landmines in many districts and made preparations to face the oncoming enemy attack. But, the police forces, which took unearthing of landmines as a campaign from the end of November, have removed them. We have decided to attack the enemy forces that venture into the interior places for combing operations and as per this decision; we have laid our first ambush in the AOB during the mid December. Enemy stopped combing operations and he could remove many of the landmines.
To launch the attack after removing the landmines is the plan of the enemy. We have not completed our necessary military preparations by the time enemy started attack in the month of January, 2005. We have assessed that by mid December by the end of ceasefire, the enemy may launch attack. Though we planned to be ready to face the attack, this lapse occurred. In some districts, military equipment was not ready. Reccee was not conducted.
The political miscalculation that the government may not start attack till the mid February,2005 is one of the reason for this. The government’s announcement that police would maintain restraint for additional two months after the ceasefire date, gave scope for this miscalculation. Our weaknesses in countering the enemy attacks did not rise suddenly during the talks period. Weaknesses existed for a long time. By utilising these, enemy could cause loss to some extent by indulging in fake encounters.
Our counter attacks are weak. If we fail to launch effective attacks and cause substantive loss to enemy, in the coming time it would be difficult to retain and organise our successes. In the event of ineffective resistance, our new recruits may get demoralised and surrenders may increase. To avoid losses, we should prepare specific plans to retreat our forces in considerable number from the plains and semi forest areas of Andhra Pradesh and NT. At the same time, we should conduct resistance actions.
While taking all the precautions to protect our forces, we should launch tactical counter attacks with the remaining forces. As there is possibility that the ruling classes may come out of talks and launch attacks at any time, we should exercise utmost care – that is the important lesson that we should take from talks. In the event of enemy withdrawing from talks or even if we withdraw due to unfavourable conditions, we should be ready to hit the enemy effectively.
To say briefly, it is a good example of political interference of revolutionaries in pressurizing the Government of Andhra Pradesh to announce ceasefire and drawing them to hold talks. Though there are some shortcomings and mistakes, political initiative is the important issue. During this period our party received more publicity, legality and acceptability.
We have gathered the people in large number by utilising the situation of ceasefire. We have daringly kept our revolutionary politics before the people. But, there is wide gap between the political impact of the party and its strength. There is pressure from various institutions and from within the ruling class to shun fake encounters, to stop combing operations and to hold talks.
Crisis intensified in the ruling classes also. By motivating and by planned political interference and by utilising this crisis, Peoples’ war should be intensified. Thus the crisis among the ruling classes should be intensified. We can march ahead in many fields if we utilise the present favourable condition. By utilising the positive attitude of various democratic organisations and individuals; and their growing faith, we have good opportunity of building joint action.
Therefore we should utilise the present situation to involve the people in solidarity to the militant political struggles against imperialist globalisation, against state violence, against the fascist forces. We should try to develop the war between police and PLGA as a war between the oppressive forces of ruling classes and the wide public under the leadership of PLGA . We should utilise this situation to strengthen our gains and to strengthen our party and PLGA and also to establish revolutionary peoples power organs in the rural areas.
13. Resolution on Regional Committees ( /- )
Regional committees may be formed in the states and zones falling in the limits of CRB, as per our party regulations. In the past, we have formed sub zonal bureaus with SZCMs in three zones except in Andhra Pradesh, which yielded positive results. There is no need of sub zonal bureaus where there are regional committees. However, if we are not in a position to form RCs, we may continue sub zonal bureaus.
When coordination is must at the regional level, where there is specific need and conditions at regional level, when there is sufficient leadership in the rank of DC and DVC and there is need of training to promote them to SZC and SC, there is need of one layer between the SC and SZC. Thus, the next rank leadership capable of leading at the state level can be formed. With this understanding, by discussing in the SC and SZC, such formations may be taken up in the coming time.
14. On L.G.S. formations:
(Upto D.C./D.V.C, Where these changes pointed out by R.B to be made, this should be made known to the D.C or DVC, concerned A.C) LGSs are providing protection to our party area committees. Their strength is not same in all zones (they are in 3-9 strength). The strength is being decided on the terrain, status of enemy, public base, our armed strength, militia formations, strength of peoples unions etc., in those zones and divisions in those zones. This is proper.
The strength of the LGS members should be decided by keeping the above conditions in those areas (divisions, areas) in view and by following the general direction to form one peoples militia and SGS in each AC area. Where the strength of LGS is five, seven, nine, there are some problems for the commander in performing his duties, as he has to attend to the mass work of that area.
Therefore, where there is possibility, if a separate commander is appointed, there will be feasibility in the work of ACMs attending the mass work. There is no need of any rule that the commander should be a comrade of ACM level. Senior party members who are daring, having initiative, capable of commanding the dalam (to LGS party members in NT) may be given the post and developed. As there will be ACMs in the dalam, they can look after the political responsibilities.
If there are more than one ACM in a LGS, depending on their work division, it should be decided whether they would remain in the area independently to perform their work or whether they would stay together; after giving due importance to the security of the concerned DC, DVC, ACs under the guidance of ACM/SZCM.
They should depend more on the militia and workers of peoples unions for their security. Likewise, if a command is formed in the AC area, the ACMs would plan their programmes along with the command inchrages, accordingly, secondary forces, base forces should be coordinated to take the security responsibilities of ACMs. ACMS should continue their movements secretly. ACs should make the militia understand. In expanding the organisation and the combat forces, the strength of LGSs and weapons should not be reduced and the security should not be weakened.
15. Jan Militia Squad( )
(A) The C.R.B, which discussed the experience of P.L.G.A in Bihar – Jharkhand area, has decided that Jan Militia Squads should be formed as part of the base forces. 1 – 4 Jan Militia Squads should be formed in one A.C. area. They should operate in the area of 20-25 villages. In one unit, there should be 5,7,9 members. They can be formed fully with P.Rs and F.Ts.
However keeping in view the higher formations in D.K, now there should be at least two full timers in these. Commander should be a P.R. During the harvesting season and for other family needs, the members may go to their houses. These units partially participate in production. Therefore, these forces should be considered as base forces.
These units will provide protection to ACM/LGSs. They continuously participate in actions resisting the enemy. These units should be developed by making them to function with a view to develop them into SGSs and as a resource for recruitment to the secondary and main force of PLGA. Jan Militia squads should be formed with selected forces of 5-7 to harass and cause loss to enemy and to annihilate if possible, near crucial river points, roads, at Police Stations / Camps and thus limit their movements.
As Jan Militia squads are being formed newly, in some areas where there are no efficient commanders from the local militia (GRD,PRD), senior PM with required efficiency from LGS or CGS may be appointed as the commander. Especially for the formation of Jan Militia squads around the rivers, roads, near Police Stations / Camps, the commanders should be picked up from LGS and SGS. (B) As decided by the D.K. secretariat, Militia may be formed in the Platoon formation in G.B. areas.
In the areas where R.P.Cs are existing, there are 3-5 militia units. Outs this, one is PRD while the remaining are GRDs. As each unit has 7 to 11 members, there are 21 to 45 militia members in each local R.P.C. All these are jointly participating in the resistance attacks against the enemy and also in providing security to the meetings held by the party and peoples unions. Though they are in different units as per their formation, in practice, they are acting as one formation during the attacks.
In these conditions, to use militia as powerful tool in resisting the enemy and the need to have platoon formation in the militia has arisen in GB areas. In Guerilla Zone area, leadership capable of running platoon level formation did not form till now. Hence, G.B. areas, by merging Militia units in the RPC area, Platoon formation may be done. In areas where platoon formation is done, they should be suitably armed and trained to fight war. Depending on situation, this platoon undertakes attacks in centralization and decentralization methods.
During the times of attacks, while protecting meeting places, during training, this unit remains in one formation and in remaining times, this formation works at section level in their respective villages.
17. Joint Action, Peoples Unions sub committee
(For APSC, NT, AOB, SZCS) A sub committee should be formed to coordinate joint action activities, peoples unions and movements in three zones of A.P. This sub committee should be under the guidance of C.C. Each zone should allot one SZCM/SCM for this sub committee. For the time being, APSC, AOBSZC will allot members. NTSZC would try to allot one SZCM with in a year. This sub committee will meet once in six months. A special body would be formed with DCMs of three zones. Though this, it will guide the FCs of Peoples unions. Each of the sub committee members should guide 2 FCs through one of the members of the above special body. Guidelines for this should be prepared.
18. Separate Telangana
(For APSC, NT, AOB, SZCs) NTSZC, APSC should take a specific programme on separate Telangana. To prepare this programme, the concept found in the document of 1997 on separate democratic Telangana and the guidelines of former CPI ML Peoples War CC should be taken as the basis. The old union that was formed with this demand is exposed and because of the oppression of the enemy, became defunct. Therefore, a new organisation should be formed and precautions should be taken to see that it is not exposed to enemy. This organization should be formed as a wide forum based on democratic programme with a demand self reliant Telangana.
Apart from building an independent organization, effort should be made to form a joint action movement by unifying all the forces that have taken up struggle for separate state. Opportunism of Telangana should be exposed. Efforts should be made to organise the democratic forces present in Telangana for a militant struggle. For the necessary arrangements, sufficient time may be taken. NTSZC, APSC should immediately coordinate and allot necessary forces.
19. Killing of Informers, Burning of Buses
( Up to A.Cs) During the January of this year, when Police started their cruel attacks and fake encounters in A.P., in some districts bus burning incidents, destruction of properties and many murders of informers took place. The former Peoples War CC had reviewed the defects in the killing of base people on the suspicion of informers. We should keep in mind that our actions should not be detrimental to the interests of people. If buses are burnt, government stops buses to the interior villages, which causes severe inconvenience to the rural people. This will lead to disaffection and opposition towards our party and movement.
Hence, the defects in these should be rectified. In fact, in the past two months, our resistance to the police attack is very weak. In the state, our squads killed about 45 informers. Police did not loose anything. Their cruel attack is continuing without any stop. Our actions against the informers, our bus burnings, our destruction of property is not showing any impact on the morale of our enemy. We can create a political impact in the state and also instill confidence in our cadres only by attacking police officers and top political leaders and cruel officers. We should concentrate on attacking serious targets.
We should stop burning buses. We should concentrate our attacks on Police personnel who are cultivating informers and thus cause huge loss to police. Thus, we can weaken the informer network. By concentrating on police on one side, informers should be punished as per the class and people approach. Concentration should be on imperialist, CBB decided and on identified Government properties.
20. Sending of cadres to DK and AOB from NT and AP
(Up to APSC, NTSZCs) The former Peoples war ninth congress had explained the dialectic relation between the strategical areas and other areas. It stressed the need to send all types of cadres to strategic areas from semi forest, plain, town areas. It gave call to form liberation zones in DK and AOB. As per this, we are sending cadre from NT to DK and from AP to AOB.
Apart from this, in view of severe attacks of enemy, we have identified the need of transferring cadre from NT and AP as part of our retreat. In the past four years after the IX congress, we should review whether any mistakes took place in transferring the cadre from these two zones under severe state repression. In these two states, we should impart necessary training to all the party cadres and enlighten them. They should be made ready to retreat to DK and AOB when the situation worsens. Likewise, the cadre should be made to be prepared for transfer to strategic areas on the call of leadership.
21. One News Magazine for three zones
(For APSC, NT, AOB and SZCs) Presently, there are separate official news magazines for APSC, NTSZC and AOB. Due to this, translation and repetition of writing essays is occurring and energy is being wasted. With a view to save the resources, it would be better if one news magazine is brought out for the three zones together. Presently, this magazine comes out once in three months. The responsibilities of this magazine should be taken up by Comrade S.V and by one each from A.P and AOB.
The completed magazine would be sent to the remaining two zones in print media and also in e-format. In those zones, other necessary combat and other activity reports may be added and published. Necessary arrangements should be made to send reports and essays to APSC in time. As ‘Kranthi’ name became popular in the past three decades, it may be retained.
22. On Party Cadre Nursing (For D.Cs)
To develop the movement with high goals, cadre nursing should be made an important duty. By forming strong peoples movements, cadres should be developed from Peoples Unions and Peoples Militia. Local leadership should be developed as per specific plan. As part of this, the following issues should be kept in view:
1. Our effort should be to maintain continuity of leadership to the movement for the development of movement and its spread. All the committees should have the goal of developing leadership cadre into every level.
2. There should be concentration on developing leadership from the base people (Class Leadership)
3. Core leadership should be developed in all levels by collective work. They should be encouraged to express their opinions freely and decisions should be taken collectively. Should cooperate for the implementation with personal responsibility.
4. The approach should be to correct the negatives of the cadres based on their positives. How much is understood should be the measure rather than how much is told to the cadres. The leadership should be responsible for the portion that is not understood. In the party, people from agriculture, tribes, and women sections are the highest. This is a positive point. Planned effort should be done for their development. With a view to develop the movement further, with a view to develop the required leadership cadre, planned effort should be done by discussing in the SZC / SCs.
23. (For CRB, AOB, AP Committees)
Comrade Ganganna who was allotted to SCOPE work should continue there contrary to the decision made by concerned CCMs to send him to AOB. CRB decides that in his place another DCM should be sent to AOB from AP Committee.
24. (For NT, AOB, AP Committees)
As per the resolution of teaching S&T, MLM documents to State Committees, classes have been completed in DK. CRB passes resolution stating that it should be completed in the remaining 3 states also.
28.*(To concerned SZCs)
By the end of this year, CRB x should be formed in z area. To form foundation for this from now itself, two LGSs should be posted in this area. This duty should be taken up by S3 committee. One Staff (type) Comrade each from NT, AOB and one commander and 5 members each from NT and DK, three dalam members from AOB should be provided by August 2005.
30. CRB duties in the coming two years (For Party Members)
1. The multi faceted fascist attack of enemy should be defeated by strongly depending on the people and by collecting primary, secondary and base forces under PLGA. In the armed revolutionary people’s war and in repulsing the enemy armed and anti revolutionary attacks, the role of people should be increased.
2. Generate a flood of Militant political struggles of people. People should be organized on various problems and in support of people’s war, against the repression campaign of enemy. The war should be converted into a great war between the people and state.
3. By recruiting PRs and by training them in ideological, political, military aspects, the party, peoples army, revolutionary peoples unions should be unified and strengthened. Special interest should be taken to build specific secret party machinery. Party committee organisation should be strengthened. In the wide rural area, among the farmers, women and youth, secret peoples unions should be organized. They should be brought together through class wars.
4. G.B. areas should be developed with time bound goals and with an aim to setup base areas. With special concentration on GB areas, Guerilla war should be made severe in Guerilla Zones. War should be extended to the neighbouring areas as per a plan. Revolutionary peoples empowerment organs should be established at various levels.
5. PLGA forces should be given necessary military training. Command setup should be built at various levels. State Military Commissions should be formed. The armed resistance of Militia units should be increased by increasing their strength and by arming them with the traditional weapons. PLGA forces should be given more fire power.
6. By utilizing the inconsistencies among the ruling classes, the people’s war should be intensified. By intensifying the people’s war, by enthusiasm, according to a plan, by political interference, the internal crisis of ruling classes should be intensified.
7. Against the common enemies, by bringing various oppressed sections, women, oppressed castes, tribes, harassed religious minorities, national bourgeois class and other democratic forces in to struggles, a strong strategic joint action forum should be formed at the state level.
8. To facilitate the deployment of guerilla forces, new centers should be spread as per plan. For contiguity, the gaps in the different organisational areas should be filled.
9. To fulfill the immediate goal of forming base areas and PLA, cadre should be sent to strategic areas from NT and AP. As per plan, some forces should retreat to strategic areas from plains and from semi forest areas. Should ensure that there are no unnecessary losses.
10. Forces should be allotted to work in labour class and in other oppressed sections in town areas. Leadership committees should bestow special interest to work as per plan in the town areas.
C.M.C. RESOLUTIONS March, 2005
Our assessment of enemy future plans, political and military aims to suppress the movement
After the formation of new Communist Party of India (Maoist), central government convened a meeting of DGPs in Delhi. This meeting assessed that the left wing extremism has become a serious breach to the internal security. Earlier, ethnic movements were considered to be the first dangers. Leftwing extremism used to be in the second place.
But, in the meeting held in December, 2004 it is assessed that the left wing extremism is equated with the gravity of cross border terrorism. Based on this new assessment, UPA has altered the strategic plans of former NDA government. It has intensified attacks to suppress our movement. The union government assessed that Naxalites are active in 125 districts of 13 states and they are soon spreading to 25 districts more.
Important aspects of Central Government plan:
It is decided to deploy Para military forces coupled with intelligence in naxal affected areas on permanent basis to suppress Naxalism. Already 25 Battalions of Para Military forces are deployed in Naxal affected areas of the country. It is decided to raise additional 66 Battalions by 2006, and to send them to Naxal affected areas. Plans were there to raise separate Para military force to suppress Naxalite movement and to deploy these forces in the affected areas on permanent basis.
It is also decided that in these Para military forces (CRPF, IRB) local tribal youth would be recruited. The enemy thought that this section, which is aware of the social, economical, language and terrain, would be able attack on the Guerillas with initiative. It is decided to form a joint task force under the leadership of Union Government to suppress the movement. It is also decided to form STF by deputing staff from military, BSF, CRPF, state police and other organisations.
A unified command would be set up to coordinate the deployed Para military forces and state police forces. In addition to this, government is forming regional commands at the regional levels. One nodal officer is appointed in each regional operational command. From these Para military, state police forces, chosen staff is deployed in the affected areas to suppress the movement. These are trained at the CIJWS at Vairangte in Mizoram state. They are trained in anti guerilla warfare and anti jungle warfare.
They are forming A.P. Greyhounds type of forces based on the staff trained in Mizoram military school and in Hyderabad Police Academy. In attacks against us, these greyhounds forces are kept in the forefront. Enemy is trying to establish anti guerilla warfare and anti forest warfare schools in all affected states. As a part of this, Chattisgadh government is establishing anti revolution jungle war school at Kanker. Such schools impart anti revolution war training.
They upgrade the war efficiency of police. Thus they are trying to get more results with less strength. These forces are being strengthened by equipping them with modern weapons like AK, INSAS, Grenade Launchers, Mortars, long rage walkie talkies, GPS equipments, Satellite phones to communicate from Police Stations to district head quarters. In some areas, armed vehicles are being provided. Bullet proof and mine proof vehicles are also being provided. Enemy is trying to implement LIC method of “facing guerilla as a guerilla” (i.e., surprise attacks on guerillas by secret and quick movements). Enemy has identified the limitations of Commando type of attacks.
Therefore, deploying large number of Para military forces and state police and trying to annihilate us by conducting military campaigns and by encircling us. When we want to launch counter attacks on the plans of enemy, we should keep in mind, the attacks of Para military forces. On one hand, central and state governments are making military preparations. On the other hand with a view to suppress the movement politically, many deceitful tactics are being followed.
As a part of this, there is an attempt to suppress the Naxalite issue by military methods. On the other hand, they are saying that Naxalite issue is socio economic issue. Reforms are being taken up where in a small section is benefited and thus establishing a social base for them. For these reforms, state and central governments are spending crores of Rupees. Already 35 Crore Rupees were allotted to Naxal affected areas. These allocations may go up.
Many of these are coming in the form of Prime Minister Gram Sadak Yojana, building of roads etc., schemes. Thus the facilities needed for the police are being created. NGOs, Hindu Religions Institutions, Christian Missionaries are being encouraged. People are being divided. There is conspiracy to divert people from the struggle line. In place of the repealed POTA, central government has formulated Prevention of Illegal activities act (UAPA). There are some black laws under implementation in some states under the guise of prevention of organised crime. In states like Chattisgadh, such laws are being framed.
Through these laws, they are trying to ban our party and peoples unions and trying to suppress the nominal democratic rights of people. Further they are trying to legalise the suppressive activities of Police and trying to establish police state in the entire area of our organization. The information network in the organization area is being strengthened. Like in Andhra Pradesh, in all states Coverts and Nalladandu gangs are being formed.
To coordinate these activities, SIBs are being planned in all the states. It is decided to concentrate especially on the annihilation of state and central leadership. As a result, in these three months, we have lost Karnataka State Committee Secretary Comrade Saketh Rajan in Police firing. AOB SZCM Comrade Vinay was arrested on second date.
These indicate that in the coming period, the enemy will concentrate only on the leadership. Enemy is going to intensify negative publicity that Naxalites are anti-development people and they have links with ISI. Besides this, it is publicised that communism is outdated and nothing can be achieved through weapons. In the past few years, to shift the injured police men and to shift police and civilian staff during elections, for aerial surveys, helicopters are being used.
Now they are being used widely. They are being used to know our movements, to conduct reconnaissance of our camps, to survey and to chase our forces, to launch aerial attacks and also to attack our leadership. At the center, UPA came into power in place of NDA. In the states, Congress came to power in the place of BJP and BJD. Whichever party is ruling, central and state governments are implementing globalisation, liberalisation and privatisation policies under the leadership of American Imperialists from 1991.
They are going to continue them in the future. Hence, people of all sections are moving into struggles out of insecurity. Our party is coordinating the increasing people’s movements and struggles and directing them in the right direction. That is why the exploitative ruling classes fear loss of power and they are implementing suppression on our movement and on people’s struggle. This is the first country wide suppressive attack. This is a counter revolutionary war launched with the experience of attacks launched on us under the leadership of American Imperialists.
More fascist methods are being implemented compared to the earlier attacks. The ruling classes are formulating many strategic plans for the attacks carried out with the support of imperialists, especially American imperialists. The aim of all these is to exploit the large population. Till the every day basic problems of people are not solved, any amount of severe suppression has to be faced.
Based on this, we should organise the people. If we take up peoples’ war in the light of Maoist peoples’ war strategy and if we can follow the guerilla war principles, the counter revolutionary will ultimately fail. We will organise and alert the people to protect the peoples state power that we are establishing to protect the results that we have achieved in the 25 years of war. We will nullify the government attack by using the peoples base and by utilising the favourable terrain and with the political and military tactics.
2. Attack to counter the attack of enemy
The class enemy is launching attack as per the military and political plan to destroy the revolutionary movement. We can neutralize the conspiracy of the enemy by preparing the political and military counter attack. We should concentrate on the following points:
1. Ours is peoples’ war. Only by organizing large number of people in the war, we can face the enemy. We can successfully face the attack of enemy to the extent of our mobilising the people politically and militarily. Hence, we should educate the people in this regard. By developing the political awareness among the people and by mobilising them, we can make them understand the need of their participation in the war. For this, we should make efforts.
2. The enemy is launching attack on us in the form of Nalladandu gangs, by luring the weak forces of our party and by converting them as coverts. In some areas these tactics are being used. Later, this tactic would be used in other areas also. There for, from now itself, we should prepare the counter attack. We should be dynamic and face the enemy boldly. We can face the enemy successfully by fighting bravely and by removing our weaknesses.
Government machinery is speeding up reforms in war zones to instill confidence in the government and to make people dependent on government. At the same time, extending the informer network and coverts. Intensifying the campaign to destroy us. By reviewing the entire situation, we should keep all the committees alert against the tactic of enemy.
3. After receiving information from informers, Police, CRPF, Commandos, Greyhounds, all forces attack on us. Therefore we should plan for destroying the secret organisation of enemy by launching attacks on the information network of SIB, IB. We should not take surrendered cadres into party of squads. ( along with, essay would be given in Jang) Attack is an important point in self protection, in balanced condition, in attack mode and also in counter attack mode. The level of attack action is different in different actions.
By taking attack as the prime issue, we keep the planning and execution in our hands. Later, with the opportunity of deploying our forces, we can launch active counter attack. Without specific plan and without active initiation, we should not indulge in any war. Active initiation is crucial for victory.
4. Depending on the situational levels, the following decisions are taken for struggle:
a. Depending on the local struggle conditions and based on our strength, we should plan actions for annihilation of enemy and to seize weapons in Bihar, Jharkhand, Dandakaranya and in Andhra Pradesh. We are adopting combat methods of Ambush, raid, short surprise attack and many other methods. In the outer circle, we attack on centers where the enemy is weak.
In the inner circle, we should organise base forces and the people against the invading enemy. We should involve people in the annihilation of enemy and in harassing the enemy. We should try more to implement this in Dandakaranya, Bihar, Jharkhand, NT, AOB.
b. In 3U, OS, DB we should continue attacks on class enemy and other enemies. We should conduct actions against police and seize weapons. We should plan our actions in such way that they resist the initiative of the enemy. We should cause heavy losses to the enemy. We should organise militia and people in these actions.
c. The situation is different in different regions. Therefore we should plan struggle based on the area situation. If we deviate from this, we would suffer losses. CMC members should practice secrecy. Other commissions, commands and all the military cadres also should practice secret methods. At the same time, we should follow secret methods in reconnaissance. We should properly maintain maps, planning sheets and decisions on actions. Otherwise, due to our negligent behaviour, they will fall into the hands of the enemy and our planning gets spoiled.
They understand our plans. In this regard, in the entire Andhra Pradesh and in other places there are certain weaknesses. We should take care in this regard. We should not take it easy. We should not talk about reconnaissance to others.
d. While planning we should take into consideration, the strength of PLGA and weaknesses of enemy. We should consider all aspects when we plan big operations. We should make preparations where victory is assured. They only, we should go ahead. We should not fight war when there is no scope of winning. We should follow Comrade Mao Guerilla war method of “you fight in your method – we fight in our method. When victory is assured, we fight. We do not fight when there is no chance of winning.”
e. In order to take struggle or war to a high level, it is necessary to take up same type of attacks in Bihar, Jharkhand, DK and AOB. Initially we should concentrate on one or two targets. With the experience gained, we should plan for attacks on various targets and we should win them. Thus we should take the struggle to a high level. In Andhra Pradesh, while concentrating on small attacks on the enemy forces, under favourable conditions, we should plan for one or two relatively bigger actions.
f. There are many instructions relating to this in our strategy and tactics document. In view of the approach of enemy, we should organise people. We should face the oppression. We should organise and make the people participate against the enemy in protecting the people’s empowerment and to spread the peoples struggle.
We should never forget this. Enemy is always trying to alienate us from the people. Therefore we should organise people in all the ways. Revolutionary struggle should be in the form of struggle between state and the people. We should take care that it should not take the form of struggle between the party and the state.
5. Resolution on Military Commissions, Formation of Commands, working system and duties.
The Central Military Commission of the CPI (Maoist) is formed with the merger of former CPM (ML) Peoples War and the former MCCI. We have decided its formation, working system and duties. Likewise, based on the guidelines of CMCs of both the parties and the new CMC, respective state, special zonal, special area, regional committees have decided the formation of their military commission, their working system and duties. That is why those issues are not being referred here.
The former CPI(ML) (Peoples War), former MCCI had formed their military commissions and commands separately and under their leadership, by annihilating the Indian armed forces, they developed. Due to the existence of military commissions, military commands under different revolutionary parties and minor differences in their structure, working system and duties, the CPI (Maoist) has taken a decision to have uniformity in the type of commissions and commands in the party.
As a part of this, there should be Central Military Commission, State Military Commission / Special Zonal Military Commissions / Military commissions of Special Area Committees. Under the concerned state / Special Area / Zones, there should be sub zonal / regional, zonal/divisional/district, sub zonal/sub divisional, area commands should be there. As the limits of special area of B-J is very wide, there shall be regional military commission under the area military commissions. (it should be understood that sub zonal commands of central region are of regional level. In B-J area sub zonal means sub divisional level) Central Committee will lead the entire party and PLGA forces on political, military and organizational fronts.
According to the political and military strategy of Central Committee, to our entire PLGA forces, State / special area / special zonal military commissions / regional military commissions will provide military and political leadership. The central military commission should strengthen the special zonal / special area and regional military commissions.
These commissions should be guided in such a way that through these commissions, PLGA is transformed into PLA. These commissions should be developed to a level where they can understand attack tactics followed by the enemy forces, covert tactics and conspiracies and prepare the counter attack tactics. State, special zone, special area, regional military commissions in their states, zones, special areas with a duty a of transforming PLGA into PLA, all the commissions should develop commands at all levels in a way that they win in the War field. The leadership of commands should be developed in such a way that they are able to fight wars bravely in any critical situation. The PLGA forces should be trained to repulse the covert tactics and attack tactics of enemy forces.
The commands should be shaped to repulse the various tactics of enemy forces. To run the war more efficiently and to transform PLGA into PLA, to annihilate the enemy forces more efficiently, sub-zonal commands, zonal / district commands should be strengthened and widened. Commissions should strive to establish area commands in all districts and zones.
A qualitative change can be brought in Guerilla warfare by the formation of commands at all levels and by strengthening them politically and militarily. These commands will play important role in transforming Guerilla bases into base areas and in the conversion of Guerilla warfare into mobile warfare and ultimately lead to base war.
Structure of Commands:
The Command structure of former CPI ML Peoples War was like the following. There should be Sub-Zonal (means regional level), Divisional / district commands. While one SMC member is incharge and commander in chief of Sub-Zonal command, PPCSs, District Command incharges (DVCM) would be members.
While one DVCM who is responsible for Divisional / District military subject in the Divisional District Command acts as the incharge, the platoon commanders of those divisions and LGS Commanders would be the members. In the limits of Area Command, commands are formed with one ACM responsible for the military subject, SGS commander working in the area limits with some people from the PR incharge of Militia. The Command structure of former MCCI was like the following. Regional Military Commission was under the Special Area Military Commission. Under these, there used to be Zonal (means Division / District level), Sub-Zonal (here sub zonal means sub-division level or the formation which is below the division and above the area level), area commands.
In the Zonal command, Zonal Committee member, all platoon commands operating in the zone and all deputy commanders would be the members. In this, Regional Military Commission member also will be a member. Zonal committee member would be incharge for this. In the sub-zonal commands, sub-zonal committee member, locally operated LRGs Commander, LRG deputy / assistant commander, SRGS Commander, SRGS deputy / assistant commander would be the members. From Zonal command, one would attend meeting (not a member). In the area command, all the commanders of LRGS operating in the area and deputy commander, one ACM responsible for the military subject would be the member. ACM himself will be the incharge for this.
One member from sub-zonal command would attend the area command meetings. To bring commands in to uniformity and to develop them into strong commands, Platoon Commanders and Company Commanders should be placed in Zonal Command. From now on, there should not be any Platoon deputy commanders in the commands. Henceforth, the command structure would be as following:
◦ There is Sub-Zonal command in AP, NT, AOB, DK, which is equivalent to the RC committee of the Bihar – Jharkhand. The Zonal Command present in the Bihar – Jharkhand area is similar to the District / Division command of AP, NT, AOB, DK. ◦ Zonal command will be with the members of Zonal Command. In this, zonal committee member also will be present.
The commanders of the company which is the main force of the zone or the commanders of the platoon which is the main force will be present in this zonal command. Regional military commission member will be the commander in chief for this zonal command. As main forces are in the zonal level in Bihar – Jharkhand, the zone level command in chief should be the member of Regional Military Commission. ◦ In AP, AOB, NT, DK main forces are in the state level and there are sub commands.
Therefore, here in the sub commands, main force company commanders of DVC level, platoon commanders of main force, DCM/DVCM from the district will be the members of sub-zonal command. A member of the state military commission would be command in chief of sub zonal command.
◦ In Bihar – Jharkhand, 3U SAC also in the zone level and sub-zone level commands, the company commanders and platoon commanders of the main forces should in these commands. State and Regional military commission members should be the Command in chiefs. ◦ In the district commands, along with the district command member, who is a DCM, the platoon commanders or SGS commanders of the secondary forces would be the members. DCM or Division Committee Member would be the command in chief.
◦ This command will consist of the ACM who is member of the area commands/ area committee along with SGS commanders or SDS commanders (PR). One ACM will the command in chief for this. Working Pattern of Commands: Sub zone, zonal / district commands should hold meetings with in 4-5 months.
• Should review the achievements and short comings of our operations conducted against the enemy.
• Should review the attacks of enemy and loss caused to us and to the enemy.
• Should review the tactics followed by the enemy, his achievements and shortcomings, our tactics, achievements and shortcomings.
• There should be criticism and introspection.
Duties of Sub-Zonal, Zonal / District Commands:
The importance of commands in the war field is crucial. The commands should change the war actions based on the changing war situations. War tactics should be changed from time to time to the extent needed. The commands should meet from time to time to understand the tactics of the enemy and should take suitable war decisions.
In the working system, the command meetings are not held properly. By conducting meetings and by reviewing the war situation, commands would assess the situation properly and form suitable war strategies. Therefore, the commands will be able perform their duties efficiently by conducting meetings by overcoming the minor problems in the war field and by formulating suitable tactics and leading the war.
• The commands of Central and State military commissions should be followed and the required operations should be conducted. If there are central and state commands, their commands and the operations required by them should be conducted and participated.
• Annihilation of enemy and seizure of his weapons, destroying the enemy bases in the zonal and sub-zonal area.
• Annihilation and harassing the enemy and snatching his weapons when he enters the guerilla zones or guerilla base to attack on the people and to suppress our movement.
• Based on the strength of the enemy forces, by centralisation and decentralisation of our forces in the command, should launch attacks on the enemy.
• Assessing the strength and weakness of the enemy forces and bases, their tactics, preparing the counter tactics and implementing them.
• Establishing intelligence in the respective sub zonal, zone / district limits.
• To develop the fighting capability and techniques of commanders and fighters in the PLGA and shaping them to become daring guerilla fighters.
• Developing PLGA fighters into highly disciplined fighters.
• Imparting continuous military training to PLGA forces and giving regular practice to them.
• To prepare the PLGA fighters to fight with severe attack spirit under critical situation.
• To establish Transport, Communications and medical wings in the commands area.
Duties of Area Commands:
• Following the instructions of state, regional military commissions, zonal, sub zonal, district commands and conducting operations decided by them and participating in them.
• To conduct independent attacks on the enemy bases in the area along with the main secondary forces, annihilating the enemy, harass and to snatch weapons.
• To conduct independent attacks along with the main secondary forces on the enemy who ventures into the area to attack on the people; annihilating the enemy, harass him and to snatch weapons.
• To cause severe loss to the enemy by making the basic militia (basic force) participate in all the attacks against the enemy.
• To study the attack tactics of the enemy forces, his strength and weakness.
• To establish peoples intelligence depending on the people in the area level and village level.
Formation of Company Party Committee:
The strength of the company should be decided based on the strength of our forces, leadership, availability of weapons in those areas. Party Committee should be formed in the company to run it in accordance with our strategy. This committee should be formed with the comrades of DVC level. The platoon commanders of the company who are not of the rank of DVC should not be taken into party committee in the company. There should be platoon party committee in the platoons that are part of the Company. There should be party cells in the sections. The party Committees, Military Commissions, Commands, PLGA Formations will be as follows:
i. Party Formation.
• SC, SZC, SAC
• DC/DVC/Zonal Committee
• Sub DC/Sub DVC/Sub-zonal committee • AC
i. Military Formation
• Central Military Commission
• State / Special Zonal / Special area military commission
• Regional Military Commission.
• District / Division / Zonal command.
• Sub district / sub division / sub zonal command.
• Area commands.
iii) PLGA Forces:
Presently, there are inequalities in the levels and development of our movement. In addition to this, the establishment and development of military formations is based on the enemy oppression, peoples base, terrain etc.,. By keeping these issues in view, there is a need to clarify regarding our main forces and secondary forces.
1. Main forces: Special Area / Special Zone / State Committees, Forces under the leadership of commission – presently, in some areas, these may be in the level of platoons only.
2. Secondary Forces: Forces under the leadership of District / Divisional / Zonal Committee, Divisional Commands. Presently, in some areas, they may be either in the level of platoons or SGS.
3. Base Forces: Base forces will be under the leadership of Area Commands. Among them are:
1. Grama Rakshaka Dalams (GRD), Athma Rakshak Dal / Self Defense Squads.
2. PRDs working in the area of local RPCs.
3. Zone Militia Squad / Peoples Militia Dal. After discussing the PLGA formations implemented by the former MCCI and CPI (ML) Peoples War, to bring uniformity, structural changes were made in the Military Commissions, Commands to suit other formations of PLGA. The LRGS formed by the former MCCI should be renamed as LGS.
The name of SGS formed by the former CPI (ML) (Peoples War) should be renamed as LGS. As the Local Regular Guerilla Squads (LRGS), Special Regular Guerilla Squads (SRGS) are neither in the platoon nor in the SGS formation and they are in the midway, they should be repealed and Platoons only should be formed.
Though they are formed with that strength under special conditions, there is no need to form them. The wording LRGS and SRGS and Regular Guerilla Squads are sounding like regular military army. Presently, ours is Guerilla army and not regular army. We can use the terminology of regular army when our PLGA transforms in to PLA.
We should not use the word ‘regular’ till our PLGA is not transformed into PLA. Therefore, now onwards, our formations should be in the form of LGS, Platoon and Company. The name of LGS looking after the security of committee members looking after organisational works in the AP, NT, DK should be changed.
6. On Political – Military Training Schools:
Under the leadership of CMC of the former Peoples War, Mobile military school was established and continued its work at the central level. Now, it should be strengthened by joining instructors of various special area / zones / states. Mobile military schools should be run under the leadership of CMC at central / special area / special zonal / state levels to provide leadership to PLGA forces and to develop them politically and militarily to achieve the goal decided by the party. School Director: CMC incharge will be the incharge director to the Mobile Military School at the Central level. At the special area / special zone / state level schools, SMC incharges will be the directors.
Aim of Central School:
i. To develop sub zonal commands / regional military commissions / state / special zonal military commissions politically and militarily. Thereby develop the leadership in the military field.
ii. To improve the fighting capability of former higher formations (Platoon, company / battalion).
iii. To strive to develop higher formations.
iv. To develop striking forces / Special Forces.
First Rank:- Members of State / special zonal military commissions, regional military commissions, Members of sub zonal commands, Commanders of Company, Battalions.
Second Rank:- Members of Divisional Commands / Platoon Commanders, SGS Commanders / LGS Commanders.
Third Rank:- PGA soldiers.
1. To make understand our political and military strategy. To aid, to develop military cadre to act in accordance with our political and military strategy.
2. To motivate the forces politically to intensify the guerilla warfare to establish guerilla bases.
3. On studying the strategy and tactics of the enemy and formulating counter tactics.
4. Platoon, company formation maneuvering drills, conducting different war actions with the platoon, company formations (attacks, raids, ambush), destroying the enemy fortifications and thus making the raids and attacks successful.
5. Use of Artillery.
6. Use of Communications.
7. Urban Combat.
8. Explosives – Sabotage – I.E.Ds.
1. Strategy – Tactics document.
2. Political Review of 9th Congress.
3. Mao military publications.
4. Peoples War – Peoples Military – Giyap.
5. Essays published in Jung.
6. Collection of reviews on raids published in Jung.
7. Collection of reviews on ambush published in Jung.
8. Urban Combat.
9. Explosives – Chemistry.
10. Basic Military Course.
11. Notes on Communications.
1. CMC should update the syllabus. CMC should prepare the required literature. Camps should be conducted in various states on decentralisation method. CMC members and instructors of Central Mobile Military School (MOMIS) should together visit states and conduct classes. On advanced subjects and new subjects, when necessary, military camps should be held in centralised methods.
2. Concerned State / Special Zones / SMCs should provide the required teaching aids to the Military Camps.
METHOD OF TRAINING:
Training should be imparted by keeping in view the situation prevailing in our military schools or where schools are not there; conditions prevailing in the state should be taken into consideration.
Though use of IEDs to repulse attacks on our forces, ambushes and raids to annihilate our enemy and snatch weapons are important, based on the local conditions and on the availability of time, number of days and subjects should be decided. Good snipers and grenadiers should be prepared during the training. The importance of initiative, tact, team spirit, planning, and leadership to gain victory in the battlefield should be emphasised. We can bring about qualitative change in the war field by extensive training to our three types of forces.